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ABSTRACT This paper aims at clarifying the role which the concept of 'divine sovereignty' 
plays in the discussions which arc raking place among Islamic thinkers (and others) concerning 
rhe possibzlity of democracy in an Islamic context. It argues that 'sovereignty' has at least two 
111eanings, one 'f'aaual', the other 'normative'. The paper also argues that the second sense of 
'sm.'erczgnty' allows us ro construe ra!k o{ 'divine sovereignzy' as an attempt by Islamic thinhers 
ro go beyond the merely procedural views of democracy which focus on the familiar procedures 
o( power comcstation, election and accountability. 
Introduction 
Islamic thinkers who want to come to terms with democracy are often thought to face 
the following difficulty. On the one hand, democracy requires the upholding of a 
principle of popular sovereignty. ln a democracy the people are supposed to rule-over 
themselves, of course. They freely give laws to themselves, and they freely obey them. 
They are subJect to no power but their own. Islam, on the other hand, seems to require 
repudiation of popular sovereignty in favor of something which is sometimes referred to 
as 'divine sovereignty'. Fundamentalist Islamic thinkers often use the slogan al-
hiikimiyya Zi-llah, which may roughly be rendered as 'sovereignty (rulership) belongs to 
God', in order to stake an anti-democratic position, and most readers have no difficulty 
in grasping the point which lies behind this slogan, viz., to warn against secularist ideas 
that do not acknowledge 'God's rule' over Muslim society. 
For those who think that 'Islamic democracy' is an incoherent concept, this is just 
one more illustration of the gulf which separates Islam and democracy. But for those 
who think otherwise there is a conceptual problem to solve, namely, to give an account 
of the notions of popular and divine sovereignty which clarifies both, and shows that the 
seeming contiict between them is more apparent than real. In this article I want to look 
at the notion of divine sovereignty as used by some Islamic writers. Several distinctions 
will be made which will hopefullv shed light on the nature of the difficulty and its 
significance. 
The Notion of Divine Sovereignty 
Let us begin by looking at statements by some leading Islamic theorists which illustrate 
their notion of 'divine sovereignty'. 
In the Qur'an it is stated: '0 believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and 
those in authority over you' (Q. 4:59). This verse establishes the basis of the 
Islamic social, political, and religious system. lt is the legal corner-stone of the 
Islamic state and constitution. It clearly indicates the center of supreme 
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authoritv in the lives of Muslims ... It also clearly indicates that obedience to 
the Messenger of God ... is the practical form in which obedience to God 
expresses itself. After this comes the power which the people exercise. The 
legitimate scope for this power does not violate divine law which is found in 
the Qur':ln and the Traditions of the Messenger. (Ghannouchi 1993, 119) 
Naturally, there is no place m Islam for a popular government which is 
separated fi·om the Faith. Islam is a monotheistic religion which permeates life 
and views it in its entirety as an act of worship. It organizes life by means of 
a religious code which does not separate political life from religious life, nor 
public life fi·om private life .... Democracy in Islam does not mean absolute 
popular power, but rather popular power in accordance with shar!'a [divine 
law]. (Turahi 1987, 63A, 67) 
The authority of government is limited because shar!'a is the higher law, just 
like the constitution except that it is a detailed constitution .... The difference 
between shura and democracy ... is that the higher law in Islam is so intensive 
that the legislature has much less to say or do. The legislature, the Congress, 
or Parliament or whatever, is not sovereign at all. The shar!'a governs so 
much. (Turabi, in Lowrie 1993, 25) 
The right of rulership gives rise to the right to legislate to people, the right to 
prescribe a way for people to live, a right to institute the values which this life 
is to be based on .... Whoever claims for himself the right to legislate a way of 
life for a people thereby claims divine authority over them, for he seeks to 
appropriate the tnost important attribute of divinity. Whoever amongst the 
people ~tccepts this claim has thereby agreed to make this person a God in 
place of the true God, for he attributes to him the most important attributes 
of divinity. (Sayyid Qutb, quoted in Abu Zayd 1994, 1 05) 
These texts, ~md others along rhc same lines, show that many Islamic thinkers want to 
draw an opposition between gm·cnmzc7tl bv people and governmcllt by God. Either a 
people govern themselves in accordance with laws of their own making, or they are 
governed by God in accordance with divine law. If one says that the former ought to be 
the case, then one expresses belief in 'popular sovereignty'; if the latter, then one admits 
the sovereignty belongs truly to God, and to God alone. This opposition between 
'government by the people' and 'government by God' is bound to seem naive to 
modern readers who do not think in religious terms. To such readers, the real 
opposition to be drawn is not between government by the people and government by 
( ~od. Rather, it is between government by the people and government by a class of 
clergy, who may be organized in terms of a church (as in the case of Christianity) or 
may not have any or much of a formal organization (as in the case of Islam). 
lvlany Islamic writers are prepared to join forces with democrats in opposing the 'rule 
of the clergy'. Believing that Islam has neither church nor clergy, they see no danger of 
'priestly government' in Islam. But even if it could be shown that the various classes of 
religious specialists, known as 'ulanza' (who include judges, imams, muftis, mujtahids, 
etc.) play a similar role, some Islamic writers continue to protest sincerely that it is not 
the 'ulama' who rule in the Islamic state, but God. For the 'ulama' are as much subject 
to divine law as the rest of the people and their special knowledge gives them no 
privilege and f,rrants them no immunities. 
This 'believing point of view' should be taken at face value. ln bet, I think we have 
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no way around this, short of engaging in a discussion of the truth of the religious 
perspective. Even then, it is hardly likely that such a discussion would lead to results 
that would he universally accepted. To explain religious categories and distinctions in 
terms which borrowed from social science (history, sociology, psychology, etc.) is a 
large project whose success is far from certain. Besides, it is not something that we need 
to assume for our present purposes. Let us therefore follow Islamic writers in thinking 
that one can (and should) distinguish between government by the people and govern-
ment by God. Some questions need to be raised about this. Do we have a case of 
genuine opposition here? That is, does government by God exclude government by the 
people and vice versa? Are there other possibilities? On the face of it, it does seem that 
there is a third possibility which Islamic writers do not dwell on. Suppose that the 
popular will and the divine will coincide, in the sense that what the popular will chooses 
1s none other than divine law. If the people fi·eely choose to be governed by God's law, 
that is, if they take God's law to be their own law, are they exercising popular 
sovereignty, or are they subject to divine sovereignty, or both? Granted that the people 
arc nut the author;~ of the 'divine laws' which they may freely choose to follow in their 
life, does this make a difference? In real life we often accept (adopt) arguments which 
we have not invented or discovered, but which we later use and present to others as our 
own arguments. Could it be the same with divine laws we may freely follow? 
These are puzzling questions to be clarified in the course of the discussion. 
Factual Sovereignty 
In order to disentangle some of the ideas which are brought together by the question 
of divine vs popular sovereignty, we need to answer a simpler, but nevertheless 
important question. Is there any way in which Islamic thinkers are willing to attribute 
to a free people an 'ultimate power' or 'ultimate authority', in some sense or other of 
these ten11s? By a 'free people' we do not mean anything extraordinarily moral or 
metaphysical. We simply mean people not ruled against their will, whether by domestic 
tyrants or foreign powers. Common sense says that a free pepole are 'sovereign' in the 
simple and straightforward sense that they can (and, barring unusual circumstances, 
most likely will) do whatever they make up their 'mind' to do; that such people do not 
wait upon anybody's permission to do what they want to do. This ability of a free 
people to carry out whatever their 'political will' decides is independent of the question 
of whether the political decision is right or wrong, whether it is something which the 
people ought or ought not to carrv out. A people may decide to invade their weaker 
neighbor, which would be wrong. Or they may decide to respect the freedom of their 
weaker neighbor, which would he right. They may decide to continue to live in a 
democratic way, which would be right. And they may decide to give themselves up to 
undemocratic rule, which would be wrong. But the right and wrong in all of these 
matters are different from the question of whether a fi·ee people have the power to carry 
them out, or at least to launch an attempt at carrying them out. 
That a ti:ee people are sovereign in the sense indicated above may be an obvious point 
which hardly needs to be belabored. But this point is exceedingly important in the 
context of trying to lay a foundation for dealing with the somewhat ethereal notion of 
divine sovereignty, and so we may be excused in dwelling on it a little longer. 
Addressing oneself to theologically-minded thinkers who are disinclined to admit 
a sense in which the people (a fi·ee people, that is) are sovereign, one could say: 
Suppose people decide to give up democracy, what can possibly stand in the way of 
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their doing so? The Constitution) But that can be amended by the people. The courts? 
Hut the judges can be replaced by the people. As Dahl says when he considers the 
possibility that a majority of people may choose to relinquish the democratic process, 
'When the democratic process can no longer be sustained in the face of a weak or 
hostile political culture, it strains credulity to believe that primary political rights will be 
preserved for long by courts or any other institutions' (Dahl 1989, 173). 
Of course, one could think of ways in which a political system may be maintained by 
sheer force, or oppression, either internal, or imposed by a foreign power. But both 
ways are inconsistent with a people being politically free, and thus having 'sovereignty' 
in its own affairs. This is a possibility which is of no relevance to our discussion. The 
debate between friends and opponents of the notion of 'divine sovereignty' takes place 
in connection with a people that is able (if it so wishes) to govern itself democratically. 
We are not interested in what happens (or fails to happen) in a society consisting of 
powerless slaves or mentally incompetent individuals. Thus it must be acknowledged 
that regardless of whether we approve of decisions taken by the people, a (free) people 
do have sovereignty. What impact this has on God's sovereignty, if any, has to be 
discussed as a separate question. No matter what the outcome of the discussion of the 
latter question, there is simply no way of getting past the empirical fact that a free 
people can (and normally will) exercise political power which may correctly be referred 
tu as ·popular sovereignty'. 
Some Islamic thinkers, at least those who are not determined to tum a blind eye to 
reality, recognize these facts. Prominent examples of this kind are Muhammad 
Khatimi, and Rachid Ghannouchi. According to the fom1er: 
It is my belief that popular will [ ... is ... j a main condition for the establish-
ment and durability of the state. Of course, I can imagine a state being 
established contrary to popular will and desire, but I find it difficult to imagine 
its being a stable and durable state, because it is not wanted in the first place. 
It is not possible for an Islamic state to come into being, nor can an Islamic 
state last regardless of the people and what they choose. Besides, nobody can 
choose a non-democratic path without having recourse to the use of force. 
There is simply no third way; those who reject the path of democracy are 
calling for dictatorship and coercion. (Khatimi 1998, 86, 99) 
Ghannouchi, on the other hand, is not as explicit as Khatimi. But his 'soul-searching' 
questions about what Islamic parties should do in the event of their failing to maintain 
a majority in free elections leave no doubt that he is of the opinion that people ought 
to have the last say in how they are to be ruled: 
What should an Islamic party do if it fails to maintain [obtain] a majority in 
free elections? Is it supposed to use armed force, or should it reform itself and 
resume the task of convincing the people of its project? Do Muslims always 
have to brandish the sword in the face of a non-Muslim majority (or even a 
1\1uslim majority) that does not want them to rule over it, when they have the 
freedom to participate and tu spread their message? In other words, where do 
lslamists derive legitimacy for their rule? Do they derive it from the mere fact 
that thev are Muslims? This is simply a paternalistic way of thinking. Or do 
thev derive legitimacy for then· rule from the people? (Ghannouchi 1993, 259) 
If we follow both IZhatimi and Ghannouchi in thinking that an Islamic state cannot 
come into existence or have stability against the wishes of the people, does that not 
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mean that people have sovere1gnty, in one sense of the term? According ro both 
authors, people can choose to follow Islam (and with It, God's law) or they can choose 
not to. In either case the decision belongs to the people. God and 'divine sovereignty', 
whatever the latter means, have to wait upon the people's choice. Given these common-
sensical admissions on the part of Khatimi and Ghannouchi, we conclude that there is 
at least one sense of sovereignty according to which we can conectly say that a free 
people have sovereignty. Call this 'factual sovereignty', on account of its having to do 
with 'the facts', vvith how things are, or can be, in reality. This leaves us with the task 
of determining the meaning, if any, which can be associated with the term 'divine 
,overcignty'. Let us therefore turn to the question: in what sense can God be 'sover-
eign'? 
The Hidden 'Oughts' of Divine Sovereignty 
In order to understand the role which the notion of divine sovereignty plays in the 
thinking of some contemporary Islamic writers who employ the term, it is helpful to 
dwellmitiallv on a certain no non of 'validitv' or 'moral rightness', as applied to political 
cleu;;Jons. (\X'e use these rem1s interchangeably; there are no commonly agreed-upon 
1dimT1S to describe the notions and distinctions we shall make presently.) We mean to 
distinguish between 'validity' (<'r rightness) on the one hand, and (mere) 'legitimacy', 
ll\1 the other. 
'Legitimacv' is a weaker notion than 'validity'. According to Rawls, 'Laws passed by 
solid majorities are counted as legitimate, even though many protest and correctly Judge 
them unjust or otherwise wrong' (Rawls 1993, 428). Thus legitimacy bears reference to 
established rules and procedures, in d1e sense d1at what is decided through them may 
be considered to be 'legitimate', at least as far as the system of rules and procedures is 
concerned. Validity, or moral nght.ness, on the other hand, is a more demanding 
notion. Laws may be unjust even when they are legitimate. Tims a law which somewhat 
overtaxes a certain segment of the population may be said to be legitimate if a majority 
of the people decides on it. But it could be unjust for all that. Nevertheless, laws which 
severely infringe rights and liberties cannot be viewed as legitimate, even when they are 
passed by legitimate procedures. As Rawls goes on to say, laws cannot depart too far 
from justice if they are to claim legnimacy (Rawls 1993, 429). In other words, too much 
injustice has a corrupting effect on legitimacy. 
\X<'ith this distinction between validity and legitimacy in mind, let us begin by 
allowing (what is hopefully not a contentious claim) that decisions taken by solid 
majorities in democratic systems are expressive of the people's being sovereign. Or to 
he on the safe side, let us say that decisions taken by solid majorities or by consensus 
are expressive of the people's being sovereign. After all, in all such decisions the people 
arc not accountable to any earthly agency; there is no court in which they can be held 
accountable. 
There are ,;trands of democratic theory that betray an inclination to assimilate 
'validity', or moral rightness, to ma)oritarian-dcmocratic legitimacy. It is as if one were 
to say: there is no meaning for the validity or rightness of political decisions apart from 
what IS deuded by the consensus of that community, or barring that, by solid 
maJorities. It is by no means obvious that this is an unacceptable position. Criteria for 
what is morally right or wrong are notoriously hard to come by. It is not obvious that 
we have access to notions of righmess and justice independent of social settings and 
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historically conditioned arrangements to be discovered in spec1fic political communi-
ties. According to 'Walzer, 
\Ve cannot sav what is due w this person or that one until we know how these 
people relate to one another through the things they make and distribute ... A 
sriven society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way-that is, in 
a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members. (Walzer 1995, 
)12 13) 
This leads \Valzer to conclude that 'Every substantive account of distributive justice is 
a local account' (\Xlalzer 1995, 314). And if Walzer is right in his account of justice, one 
can certainly understand the temptation to identify righmess and justice with what the 
people (in solid majority, or in consensus) say they are. Thus the distinction between 
validity and legitimacy collapses. The price of this is (apparently) a certain kind of 
relativism. This is something which many thinkers accept. 
Islamic (and other religious) thinkers do not accept collapsing the distinction be-
tween what is 'right' and what is merely 'legitimate' (on account of being passed by 
commonly accepted rules of procedure). Nor would they be comfortable with a 
definition of 'democratic legitimacy' that comes down to 'rule of the majority' with no 
conditions or restrictions attached. The suggestion which we want to put forward 
presently is to view Islamic thinkers' advocacy of divine sovereignty as a way of trying 
w go beyond this purely procedural view of democracy. We suggest that statements 
such as 'Sovereignty belongs to God', 'In an Islamic state only God rules', are to be 
viewed as statements about what political decisions ought to be like, if they are to have 
validitv, or moral rightness. The ideal situation is when the democratic procedure 
functions w1thin parameters set by divine law. People can debate and discuss and 
finally, vote. Furthermore there is always a way to find out whether the decision was 
'correct': not because it was accepted by the majority after discussion and debate, but 
by checking it against Shari'a. 
According to this suggestion, statements to the effect that 'sovereignty belongs to 
C1od' contain a 'hidden ought': valid political decision ought to conform to divine law. 
But this is not the only 'ought' which lies hidden in such statements. Several authors 
have suggested that placing 'rulership' in the hands of God is also directed against the 
assimilation of 'validity' to autocratic procedures where political decisions are taken by 
sultans or kings who rule absolutely, and who are accountable to no one. TI1us 
according to Hussain Ahmad Amin, this is how we ought to view the struggle over the 
Creation of the Qur'an which rook place during the tin1e of the 'Abbassid Caliph 
al-Ma'mun. To tbe Muslim 'ulanui ', led by Ibn Hanbal, the question was whether the 
Caliph was to rule absolutely, or whether his rule was to be subject to objective, binding 
criteria of righmess. Giving precedence to divine law is a way of placing restriction on 
the will of earthly rulers (Amin 1987, 11 7). According to other writers the injunction 
of divine sovereignty can be looked at as an expression of anti-despotic tendencies 
(Bisharah 1993, 83), or as something that 'provides the conceptual and theological 
foundation for an active emphasis on equality within the political system' (Esposito & 
Voll 1996, 25). 
The explanation given above for the role which the notion of divine sovereignty plays 
in the thinking of some Islamic thinkers does not depend for its credibility on the terms 
which these thinkers employ to express their beliefs. The very effectiveness of appeals 
Lo 'divine government' depends preCLsely on removing, as much as possible, all traces 
of human operation. In other words, for the discourse of divine sovereignty to perform 
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its function m the intellectual economy of political justification, it must appear to have 
extra-mundane reference. 
Still, the explanation of divine sovereignty in terms of a need to go beyond pro-
cedure-based legitimacy is forced on us by the sheer implausibility of taking divine 
sovereignty literally. It makes little or no sense to take statements such as 'Sovereignty 
belongs to God' literally. Islamic thinkers who make such statements do not mean to 
imply that the Islamic state, unlike other mundane states, has an 'Invisible President' 
who rules as mundane potentates do. For this reason it strains credulity to find Bernard 
I _cwis describing the Islamic state thus: 
The Islamic state was in principle a theocracy-not in the Westem sense of a 
state ruled bv the Church and the clergy ... but m the more literal sense of a 
polztv mlcd bv God. In principle, the state was God's state, ruling over God's 
pL·oplc; the law was Ciod 's law ... (Lewis llJ93, in Lip set 1994, 6, italics 
added) 
1\'ot only is this an uncharitable way of interpreting statements about the 'rule of God', 
it also fails to give a meaningtul explanation of what is meant by 'the literal sense' of 
being ruled by God. Surely God does not sit on a throne issuing directives and reading 
reports. In Islam, as in other religions, people take it upon themselves to 'speak for 
God', usually by reference to 'divine texts'. Belief in the divinity of origin is not an 
empirically verifiable matter, and political action does not wait upon a scientific 
decision with respect to where God is, and what his present will is. As far as all practical 
(including political) purposes are concerned, belief in the divinity of texts simply means 
that they are in some sense placed above questioning. They are taken to have 
irrevocable authority, much as the principles which are embodied in a constitution that 
lays down the rules of the political game. Just as some political decisions may be judged 
'unconstitutional', so can others be judged 'ungodly'. In either case 'validity' is not 
simply taken to be a matter of what the people say is right. 
To sum up: endorsement of 'divine sovereignty' by some Islamic thinkers may be 
viewed as an attempt to provide criteria for political rightness or validity which go 
beyond factual procedures that vest legitimacy in the hands of the people or their rulers. 
\X'e want now to see if the concerns which Islamic thinkers voice are peculiar to them, 
or if similar concerns can be found in contemporary Western political thought. 
Parallels in West em Political Thought 
Debates that are taking place now among political thinkers in the West about the nature 
of political legitimacy have yet to make an impact on Islamic understandings and 
discussions of democracy. Islamic thinkers are still inclined to identify democracy with 
models that have been variouslv called 'aggregative' (Cohen 1997, 111), 'pluralist', 
'pulyarchal' (Bohman & Rehg 1997, Introduction) and 'procedural'. 'Procedural 
democracy' is defined by Estlund as 'the view that what makes democratic decisions 
legitimate is that they were produced by the fair procedure of majority rule' (Estlund 
1997, 170). 
Nevertheless, the more well-informed Islamic thinkers are gradually becoming aware 
of a tension between the explication of democracy as 'government of the people by the 
people', and a number of basic concepts and values, which democratic practice is 
supposed to express and respect, but which seem to have validity independently of 
popular acceptance. These include the values of individual autonomy, inalienable 
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individual rights, equality, liberty, fairness, and other ideals of the democratic process. 
Democratic thinkers recognize that the unqualified concept of 'government by the 
people' docs not always offer assurance that the people will respect the values men-
tioned above .. fhus in his diSCUSSIOn of the possibility of a demos that intends tO USC the 
democratic process in order to end that very process, Dahl raises the question of 
'whether the demos may rzghrlv do what it clearly can do, or to use a different 
terminology, whether it has the authority to do what it has the power to do' (Dahll989, 
181). The clear implication here is that it is logically possible for the popular will to go 
wrong, to will what is not right or just. But this means that Dahl has criteria of political 
rightness which are somehow set above the judgment of popular will. 
\Xfhat are these criteria? How do we know them? And what kind of authority do they 
have) Ghannouchi considers the status of basic liberal principles in contemporary 
Western political theory, and he concludes that liberalism acknowledges the existence 
of 'principles higher than the human will': 
All of these remarkable experiments in liberal thought concede the existence 
of principles that are higher than the human will, be this the will of the 
collectivity, or the will of the majority. In a number of cases hints at 'divine 
law' have been preserved .... In fact, principles of Natural Law indicate that 
tbe human will has always been subject to a number of universally valid 
frameworks which it is not m a position to question. (Ghannouchi 1993, 70, 
11. 289) 
In making these claims Ghannouchi is echoing the self-perception which (some) 
\'\fc·stern thinkers have, as indicated bv the results of their search for historical-cultural 
l"oundations uf liberal beliefs. A particularly clear statement of this self-perception is 
nwde by Siedentop who claims to discover the notion of 'individual autonomy' in 
Christian thought. According to Siedentop: 
The assumption that societv consists of individuals, each with an ontological 
ground of his or her own, is a translation of the Christian premise of the 
equality of souls in the eye of God .... The birth of the individual was ... a 
Cluistian achievement (Siedentop 1989, 308; see Dahl 1989, 32-3). 
The suggestion which I want to advance here is that Islamic thinkers, in their own way, 
may be trying to formulate a conception of a method of government where the 
democratic idea of popular sovereignty is combined (tempered, if you wish) with a 
moral view that rejects the identification of 'political rightness' with the mere counting 
of votes. There arc at least two reasons which may incline Islamic thinkers to search for 
such a conception of government. The first is their belief in the cultural homogeneity 
of Islamic society. Such (presumed) homogeneity may suggest that democratic proce-
dures are not utterlv indispensable. The second is their view of procedure-independent 
validity as applied to collective dcciswns. 
According to Estlund, aggregative (or purely procedural) views of democracy are 
most likelv to find acceptance in communities which are characterized by cultural 
diversny, where there is much disagreement over standards of justice (Estlund 1997, 
1 7"5). In the absence of shared understandings that can resolve conflicting interests, the 
only principle which people may be able to agree upon is that all interests should to be 
given equal consideration, with majority voting bemg the 'natural method' to achieve 
this (Cohen 19lJ7, Ill). 
Islamic thinkers tend to believe that the Islamic political community is not character-
Ized by division and disagreement over conceptions of justice and goodness. (It is an 
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mtirely different question whether this is indeed the case.) Hence, Islamic political life 
is likely to be less competitive and more consensual than, say, liberal communities. 
Voting becomes less of a contest, and more of a popular acclamation of policies on 
which members of the community see eye to eye. 
More importantlY perhaps, validity or 'moral rightness' of political decisions is not 
something that is known by voting. \X1hereas some would say that the rightness of the 
decision is defined by reference to the nature of the procedure which is used to arrive 
at it (namely, voting), Islamic thinkers would claim that rightness depends on the 
'quality of the decision', as determined by procedure-independent means. In other 
words, theirs is what Estlund would call a 'correctness theory of legitimacy'. It is a 
member of a family of 'epistemic theories of legitimacy' which are united by their 
rejection of the assimilation of rightness to the method of arriving at decisions (Estlund 
1997, 174). Estlund is critical of correctness theories, Rousseau's theory being the one 
which the discusses. According to hin1, 'if there existed epistemic standards then it 
would follow that some know better, and the knowers should rule, as in Plato's elegant 
and repellent republic' (Estlund 1997, 181). Estlund may be right in his rejection of 
'epistocracy', that is, the 'rule of the knowers'. But this is not the place to discuss the 
'epistocratic' implications of Islamic reservations about democratic procedures. For our 
main aim is to suggest that Islamic thinkers are not unique in raising questions about 
the meaning and value of democratic procedures. Their adherence to 'divine sover-
eignty' should be viewed as an expression of their belief in the existence of standards 
and criteria for validity which are known independently of democratic procedures. 
Two Concepts of Sovereignty 
We finally come to the puzzling question of the type of 'authority' which Islamic 
thinkers attribute to criteria of political rightness which tl1ey are willing to set up as 
judge over the democratic process. We hope this will go some way towards clarifying 
the relationship between divine sovereignty and popular sovereignty. Reasons were 
presented above for rejecting the interpretation of divine sovereignty as 'direct divine 
rule'. This clain1 should be supplemented by saying that Islamic thinkers can (and 
many do) admit that there arc at least two ways in which the people can be said to 
exerc1se power. 
First, it is up to the people to accept or reject the divine message. As Khatimi says 
clearly, a stable, enduring Islamic state cannot come into existence if the people do not 
want it. This is simply common sense. We have no experience of 'divine states' being 
set up and maintained by divine powers, such as armies of angels and the like. 
Second, people exercise power not just by choosing to live under 'divine law' at all, 
but also by choosing how to live under such a law. Divine messages are subject to 
interpretation, and the interpretation is invariably carried out by human agencies, even 
when people attribute everything they do to divine guidance (providence). 
In these two very real ways, people are truly sovereign. All the ideas, principles, 
commands and injunctions that issue from 'the mouth of God' will remain inert, and 
utterly inctfccrivc, so long as thev do not dwell in the hearts and minds of people who 
arc willing and able to act on them. The same applies to liberal principles, whose 
'validity', 111 the eyes of Dahl and others, does not derive from popular acceptance. It 
makes no practical difference to human government whether the 'basic principles' have 
a divine origin, or if they have existence in some Platonic Moral Reality which human 
reason discovers. These principles are not active agents, or forces of nature. Hence they 
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can do nothing until they come ro be espoused by living human wills, until they come 
w 'inform' human minds. At the same time, we are familiar with the substantive, vital 
and indispensable role which laws play in our lives. No one can seriously claim that our 
social--political life is merely a stage for the free play of lawless irrational human wills. 
This fact, I believe, will help us define a sense in which human will is subject to the 
·~mthority of the law'. If we can do that then we shall be a position to describe not JUSt 
unc, hut twu senses of sovere1gnty, in the following manner. 
First, there 1s what we have referred to as 'factual sovereignty'. Sovereignty in this 
sense belongs to a 'ti·ee' people. A free people is sovereign in the sense of having the 
power to act 111 accllrdance wnh ns w!ll. Second, there is what we may call 'sovereignty 
m the formal sense·, or 'fom1al sovcrcit,'llty', for short. In a 'law-abiding society' this is 
the kind of 'sovereignty' enjoyed by laws, norms, or principles which meet the following 
conditions. First that they apply to everybody. People 'obey' them. Those who fail to 
do so are subject to sanctions. Second, that they are laws which people (generally 
speaking) believe in. They take them seriously, and act out of respect to them. Thirdly, 
these laws or nom1s are regarded as 'objectively right' or 'true'. They are not viewed as 
subJective inventions, or matters of community taste. 
Should there be laws which enjoy such a status in a community, we would be right 
w speak of a community where the law is 'sovereign'. This is a perfectly harmless way 
of speaking, and it is generally not misleading. It does not mean that people's decisions 
and wills an: ineflective, or non-existent; only that these wills and decisions follow 
non-arbitrarv rules, rules that are regarded as objective and universal. To attach this 
interpretation to the notion of 'divine sovereit,'llty' is a more charitable understanding 
of Islamic thinkers than the one which would have them deny that the people have any 
power to decide over anything, an idea which no reasonable person can believe. Islamic 
thinkers envision a political community where the people's will conforms with divine 
law. In such a situation the divine law will be 'supreme', but certainly not as an 
external, foreign prmciple which is rejected by the popular will. 
Of course, it may be thought that the divine laws to be found in the Scriptures are 
'divine inventions' of a willful God who could have ordained any set of laws for the 
human will to follow. But this 1s not a position which advocates of Islamic democracy 
have to accept as ~~matter of logic. For there are no compelling arguments to show that 
(~od is uttcrlv incomprehensible to us. In fact, if that were the case then not only would 
belief in Gud be antithetical w reason, but we may also be unable to attach any 
meaning to the word 'God'. Thus we are not forced to say that what God 'invents' (if 
this is a good description of what He does) belongs to a different intellectual order from 
what the human reason can understand and accept. 
It is certainly an open option for believers to think of God as akin to Moral Reality, 
so that (for example) Plato's Form of the Good could be viewed as God, or vice versa. 
In this way God definitely ceases to be something which is 'foreign' to the human mind. 
On the contrary, God's mind becomes something that we can 'see into'. But even if we 
wanted to stop short of 'internalizing God' in the aforementioned manner, there is no 
reason to think that God's authorship of the moral laws means that we cannot claim 
them as our own. Moral principles resemble arguments in the following way. You can 
discover an argument to prove a certain point, and that argument will be, in a 
straightforward sense, 'your argument'. But if I come to !mow of this argument and 
adopt it for myself, does it not hecome 'my argument' as well? The Argument from 
Design which I accept and use to defend my belief in God is my argument. I did not 
invent it, but this does not stand in the way of my calling it my own. It should be the 
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same with moral ptinciples. Principles cannot be owned any more than arguments, and 
the circumstance of this or that agent formulating, discovering or promulgating them 
first, is quite accidental to their essence. 
Understood in the light of the distinctions and clarifications presented above, divine 
sovereignty, so-called, need not conflict with popular sovereignty. Islamic democracy 
may be a difficult concept to accept, but it must not be rejected on the basis of a 
supposed conflict between divine and popular sovereignty. 
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